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To provide full accounts of human experience and behavior, research in cognitive neuro-
science must be linked to inner experience, but introspective reports of inner experience
have often been found to be unreliable.The present case study aimed at providing proof of
principle that introspection using one method, descriptive experience sampling (DES), can
be reliably integrated with fMRI. A participant was trained in the DES method, followed
by nine sessions of sampling within an MRI scanner. During moments where the DES
interview revealed ongoing inner speaking, fMRI data reliably showed activation in classic
speech processing areas including left inferior frontal gyrus. Further, the fMRI data validated
the participant’s DES observations of the experiential distinction between inner speaking
and innerly hearing her own voice. These results highlight the precision and validity of the
DES method as a technique of exploring inner experience and the utility of combining such
methods with fMRI.
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INTRODUCTION
There is a large literature in both cognitive neuroscience and
behavioral psychology that seeks to characterize aspects of inner
experience. A growing subset of studies has sought to use fMRI
to identify neural correlates of inner experience, for example
by studying thinking that is not tightly related to the current
task. This has been variously called mind wandering (Kane et al.,
2007; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Smallwood, 2013); inner
experience during resting state (Fell, 2013); undirected thought
(Klinger and Cox, 1995); stimulus independent thought (Gilbert
et al., 2007; Mason et al., 2007); task unrelated thought (Giambra,
1989; Smallwood, 2013); spontaneous thought (Klinger, 2009);
daydreaming (Singer, 1966); free thought (Doucet et al., 2012);
and so on. Those terms have somewhat different meanings, but all
depend centrally on directly apprehended phenomena of inner
experience: for example, at time t I was thinking about my
girlfriend while I was supposed to be doing my homework. Fol-
lowing Christoff (2012), we will refer to all of these as “undirected
thoughts.”
Capturing the incidence and ﬂow of such inner experience is
an intriguing challenge for neuroimaging. Undirected thoughts
have been mostly studied either by contrasting passive “baseline”
periods with an active, stimulus-driven task (see Shulman et al.,
1997) or in terms of connectivity between different brain regions
in a resting state (e.g., Greicius et al., 2008). The identiﬁcation of
brain areas and networks associated with rest allows for brain-
behavior correlations to be examined: for instance, self-reports of
a particular experience, such as anxiety, can be correlated across
a group of individuals with responses in particular brain regions
(McGuire et al., 1997; Dennis et al., 2011; Doucet et al., 2012). Of
particular note, the “default mode network” (DMN) refers to a
set of regions that appear to be consistently anti-correlated with
task-positive activity and associated with introspective processes
(Raichle and Snyder, 2007; Buckner et al., 2008). There are, how-
ever, a range of other networks also thought to be active during
resting periods, such as those guiding attentional and executive
control (Smallwood, 2013).
Recently a number of novel methods have been developed to
induce and examine undirected thoughts, most of which have
targeted instances of mind wandering. One approach is to train
participants on a particular cognitive task that is conducive to
mind wandering, deploy the task in the scanner, ask participants
to report instances of mind wandering, and then correlate this
with DMN activity (McKiernan et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007).
Another approach has been to ask participants to respond to ran-
dom probes and report on their subjective state while performing
a repetitive task in the scanner (Christoff et al., 2009; Andrews-
Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011) or during task-free rest
periods (Tusche et al., 2014). For instance, Christoff et al. (2009)
probed participants during a go/no-go task and asked them to use
Likert scales to indicate (a) whether their attention was focused
on the task and (b) whether they were aware of their attentional
state at that time (“concurrent awareness”). Self-reported mind
wandering states were associated with increased activation of typ-
ical areas of the DMN and the central executive network, and this
was particularly the case for mind wandering without concurrent
awareness (Christoff et al., 2009).
These methods offer novel ways of investigating undirected
thoughts. Nevertheless, they all involve a trade-off of some kind.
Experiences can be sampled immediately by asking participants
to make a forced-choice discrimination while in the scanner. But
such techniques almost always preclude detailed descriptions of
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1393 | 1
Kühn et al. Inner experience in the scanner
experience; experience sampling techniques are typically used sim-
ply as classiﬁers of two or three different “modes” of thinking
(such as being “on-task” vs. “off-task”; Christoff et al., 2009). If
researchers have wanted to know more about the nature of that
state, they have occasionally inquired via questionnaire or inter-
view, but these inquiries have always been retrospective, outside
the scanner (Delamillieure et al., 2010; Doucet et al., 2012; Diaz
et al., 2013). However, such retrospective reporting undermines
the immediacy of the sampling method, because self-reporting on
experience after a delay may be subject to a range of reporting
biases (Fell, 2013) and is likely to reﬂect presuppositions about
the experience rather than direct apprehensions of experiential
phenomena (Hurlburt, 2011).
A technique with the potential to offer an alternative method is
descriptive experience sampling (DES;Hurlburt, 1993, 1997, 2011;
Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001, 2002, 2006; Hurlburt and Akhter,
2006; Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel, 2007; Heavey and Hurlburt,
2008; Heavey et al., 2012; Hurlburt et al., 2013). DES uses a ran-
dom beeper to signal participants to attend to the experience that
is ongoing at the moment of the beep, and immediately there-
after to jot down notes about that ongoing experience. Within
24 h the DES investigator conducts an “expositional interview”
to discover the characteristics of the beeped pristine experience.
This process is repeated over a number of days (usually 4–6). DES
differs from other experience sampling methods in that it aims
to help participants bracket their tendencies to report presuppo-
sitions and thereby aims to produce high ﬁdelity descriptions of
“pristine” inner experiences—thoughts, feelings, sensations, see-
ings, hearings, and so on as they naturally occur in a person’s
everyday environment. It therefore does not specify characteristics
that are to be rated in a forced-choice manner, but instead explores
characteristics that emerge (Hurlburt, 2009) from the individual
person’s own experience, untainted (as much as possible) by the
investigator’s predilections.
There are ﬁve experiential phenomena that DES claims occur
frequently (Heavey and Hurlburt, 2008); we will call those the
5FP for “5 frequent phenomena”: inner speaking (Hurlburt et al.,
2013), inner seeing (aka visual imagery), unsymbolized thinking
(Hurlburt and Akhter, 2008), sensory awareness (Hurlburt et al.,
2009), and feelings (Heavey et al., 2012). However, DES is fun-
damentally an idiographic procedure, which implies that in any
particular individual it is possible that one ormore of those charac-
teristics are present, that none of those characteristics are present,
or that one or another of those characteristic might be present
in an idiosyncratic way. Thus the 5FP are sometimes convenient
ways to characterize an individual, sometimes not. That is, DES in
general has no expectations about what might emerge as the char-
acteristics of any individual’s inner experience. TheDESprocedure
is “open-beginninged” (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel, 2007; Hurlburt, 2011) in the sense that the DES
interviewer does not set out to inquire whether a participant is
innerly speaking, or is innerly seeing, or so on. If a participant,
describing her experience without beneﬁt of the DES categories,
describes (for example) inner speaking (regardless of the words
she chooses in so describing), the DES investigator will continue
to explore whether inner speaking was ongoing at the moment of
the beep.
The DES process can produce surprising results. For exam-
ple, inner speech is held by some to occur during every waking
moment (Archer, 2003; Baars, 2003; Ihde, 2012) and by others
to occur about three-quarters of the time (e.g., Klinger and Cox,
1995). DES studies by Hurlburt and colleagues, however, hold
that inner speaking is present on average only about one-quarter
of the time and in many people never or only very rarely (Heavey
and Hurlburt, 2008; Hurlburt et al., 2013). Hurlburt (2011) has
argued that discrepancies in reports of many experiential phe-
nomena are common because many if not most people do not
know the characteristics of their own inner experience, and instead
rely on presuppositions that interfere with their ability to report
reliably and accurately. Furthermore, Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
report huge individual differences in the frequency of inner seeing,
feelings, and other forms of inner experience, raising further con-
cerns about how assumptions about the nature of inner experience
might inﬂuence self-report.
In contrast to other methods, then, DES aims to clear out these
assumptions and train participants to be more careful in reporting
their experiences by avoiding generalizations, focusing on a pre-
cise moment (just before the beep), and interviewing participants
not just once but on multiple occasions, in an iterative manner
(Hurlburt, 2009, 2011). It remains to be seen whether such an
idiographic procedure can be of value to neuroscientiﬁc investiga-
tions of inner experience and undirected thought. The challenge
is to convert such a highly detailed method for use with fMRI,
and then to test (using evidence from cognitive neuroscience)
the claim that DES can offer a reliable reﬂection of participants’
experiences.
Two of us (SK, a neuroscientist, and CF, a psychologist) invited
DES-creator Hurlburt (hereafter called RH, whose work we knew
but with whom we had no relationship) to put the DES method
to the test. We recruited ﬁve participants, all unknown to RH and
unrelated to us, and invited RH to perform a typical DES investi-
gationwith each. Data on all ﬁve participants is reported elsewhere
as part of a wider study (Hurlburt et al., in preparation). Our aim
here is to establish proof-of-principle in a single participant that
idiographic investigation of inner experience, such as is provided
by DES, can be successfully combined with fMRI. As such we only
report here on one of those participants, “Lara,” an 18 year-old-
woman. As with the other participants, RH trained Lara in the
usual DES way (four sampling days in her natural environments);
then we delivered random DES beeps to her in nine sessions while
she was in an MRI scanner, four random beeps per 25-min ses-
sion. Immediately after each session, RH conducted a typical DES
interview with her about the four beeped experiences. Before the
fMRI data were analyzed, RH descriptively characterized those 36
in-the-scanner moments of Lara’s experience; these 36 DES char-
acterizations were used to form participant-speciﬁc categories on
which the fMRI contrasts would be based.
In a preliminary phase at the start of the study, for possible
comparison with the DES results, we also asked Lara to perform
conventional neuroscience imagination tasks in the scanner: we
directed her to generate speciﬁc verbal, auditory, visual, emotional,
and somatosensory imagery when instructed by prompts such as
“to see a pencil” or “to say ‘lamp’.” These conventional tasks could
then be used to test whether the neuroimaging results derived
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from the DES method were plausible, localizable, and comparable
to brain activity determined by conventional (non-introspective)
means.
Because of the idiographic, open-beginninged nature of DES,
at the outset of Lara’s DES sampling, we had no expectations
about whether one or more of the 5FP might emerge as a salient
characteristic of her inner experience. Nonetheless, to facilitate
nomothetic comparison it is useful to consider the 5FP if they
emerge. It turned out that for Lara, according to DES, sensory
awareness was the most frequent of the 5FP (27 occasions or 75%
of Lara’s 36 in-scanner samples); however, its varying modality
(visual, bodily, auditory, etc.) made it an unlikely candidate for
neural correlation. Inner seeing occurred in 8 (22%) of Lara’s 36
in-scanner samples; however, inner seeing had never occurred in
Lara’s natural environment DES sampling, so it seemed likely to
be an artifact of the scanner situation. Inner speaking occurred
in 8 (22%) of Lara’s 36 in-scanner samples; it had also occurred
in 13% of Lara’s natural environment DES sampling, so inner
speaking seems a good candidate for further consideration. Of the
remaining 5FP phenomena, unsymbolized thinking and feelings
were too rare [one occasion (3%) each]. (Percentages do not add
to 100% because multiple ratings are possible.) Thus, as a result of
Lara’s idiographic experiential result, we will focus here on Lara’s
inner speech-related neural processing.
The neuroimaging literature suggests that language or speech-
based samples are typically associated with brain areas such as left
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and
the superior and middle temporal gyri (Price, 2012; Gernsbacher
and Kaschak, 2003), with inner speech processes in particular
being linked to activation in left IFG and lateral temporal areas
(Shergill et al., 2001, 2002; Jones and Fernyhough, 2007; Marvel
and Desmond, 2012; Kühn et al., 2013). Damage to left IFG is also
associated with impairment on inner speech tasks (e.g., Geva et al.,
2011). If Hurlburt’s claims about DES were correct, the fMRI data
collected during Lara’s eight inner-speaking (according to DES)
moments should involve brain activation in some or all of the
above-mentioned areas. If this was observed, it would provide
support to the principle that DES and fMRI might be proﬁtably
combined.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study was conducted according to the Declaration of Helsinki,
with approval of the German Psychological Society Ethics Com-
mittee.
Lara was scheduled for 19 sessions across a 2-week period,
which was divided into four phases. She was right-handed and
aged 18.
In Phase 1 (introduction/in-scanner elicitation), we fully
explained the study; administered the initial questionnaires not
relevant to the present report; and familiarized Lara with the MRI
scanner and procedures. Then Lara entered the scanner, where
we conducted a 10 min structural scan and a 5 min resting state
scan according to standard fMRI research procedures (keep the
eyes closed, stay relaxed and calm). Then we administered the
imagination task, derived from a recent fMRI paradigm used by
Belardinelli et al. (2009). Participants in the scanner were shown
short written prompts to imagine saying (e.g., “to say ‘pencil’,” or
“to say ‘lamp”’), seeing (“to see a pencil,” “to see a lamp”), hear-
ing, feeling, or sensing something. The stimuli were presented in
mini-blocks consisting of four prompts of one of the ﬁve cate-
gories, each shown for 7 s with 1 s inter-stimulus interval ( =32 s
in total). Thus one mini-block consisted of four seeing prompts;
another mini-block consisted of four saying prompts; and so on.
Participants were instructed to imagine vividly what was shown
on the screen for the duration of the presentation of the prompt.
After four prompts a ﬁxation cross was shown for 19 s before the
next mini-block of prompts was presented.
In Phase 2 (natural-environment DES), we instructed Lara in
the use of the DES beeper and the sampling task (Hurlburt and
Heavey, 2006; Hurlburt, 2011): she was to wear the beeper in
her natural environment for approximately 3 h, during which she
would hear (through an earphone) six randomly occurring 700 Hz
beeps. Her taskwas to terminate the beep (a button press) and then
immediately to jot downnotes about her ongoing inner experience
that was “in ﬂight” at the moment the beep sounded. Later that
day or the next day she returned for a DES expositional interview
about those six beeped experiences; this interview was conducted
by RH and at least one and as many as four additional interviewers
(the study was part of a training program), usually including some
combination of SK,CF, andBAD.The expositional interviewswere
“iterative” (Hurlburt, 2009, 2011), designed to provide increasing-
across-sampling-days skill in apprehending and describing inner
experience. Following this interview, Lara returned to her everyday
environment, during which (and on the same day) she responded
to six more random beeps. The following day she returned for
a second expositional interview about the second-sampling-day’s
six beeped experiences. This sequence was repeated twice more,
so that Lara sampled in four natural-environment periods, each
followed by an expositional interview.
In Phase 3 (in-scanner DES), Lara (having been trained in DES
in the natural environment) entered the scanner for a 25-min ses-
sion with the instruction to keep the eyes open, stay relaxed and
calm. That is, we did not set any particular task for her other
than to respond to the DES beep (700 Hz, except these beeps were
of 1.4 s duration); she had been instructed to note her experi-
ence that was ongoing just prior to the beep (that is, in the usual
DES way). At four quasi-random times, she received a DES beep
through a headphone. Immediately after each beep, she jotted a
few notes about her experience on a clipboard positioned on her
lap (viewable through a mirror); that is, this procedure mirrored
as closely as possible the natural-environment DES procedure.
Immediately after she exited the scanner she participated in a
DES expositional interview (conducted by RH and some com-
bination of SK and BAD) about each of her four randomly beeped
experiences, in the order in which they appeared (although dou-
bling back and looking ahead was allowed). This 25-min fMRI
scan/four beeps with jotted notes/expositional interview sequence
was repeated a total of nine times, resulting in 4 × 9 = 36 random
samples of experience occurring in 25 × 9 = 225 min of fMRI
scanning.
In Phase 4 (post-DES resting state), Lara entered the scanner
for another 10 min structural scan and a 5 min standard resting-
state scan. Immediately after exiting the scanner, she completed
questionnaires not relevant here. Then she was candidly debriefed.
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SCANNING PROCEDURE
Images were collected on a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany) using a
32-channel radio frequency head coil. Structural images were
obtained using a three-dimensional T1-weighted magnetization-
prepared gradient-echo sequence (MPRAGE) based on the ADNI
protocol (www.adni-info.org) [repetition time (TR) = 2500 ms;
echo time (TE) = 4.77 ms; TI = 1100 ms, acquisition
matrix = 256 × 256 × 176, ﬂip angle = 7; 1 mm × 1 mm × 1 mm
voxel size]. Functional images were collected using a T2∗-
weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast (TR = 2000 ms,
TE = 30 ms, image matrix = 64 × 64, FOV = 216 mm,
ﬂip angle = 80, voxel size 3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm, 36 axial
slices).
fMRI DATA PRE-PROCESSING AND MAIN ANALYSIS
The fMRI data were analyzed using SPM8 software (Wellcome
Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The ﬁrst
four volumes of all EPI series were excluded from the analysis
to allow the magnetization to approach a dynamic equilibrium.
Data processing started with slice time correction and realign-
ment of the EPI datasets. A mean image for all EPI volumes was
created, to which individual volumes were spatially realigned by
means of rigid body transformations. The structural image was
co-registered with the mean image of the EPI series. Then the
structural image was normalized to the Montreal Neurological
Institute (MNI) template, and the normalization parameters were
applied to the EPI images to ensure an anatomically informed nor-
malization. A commonly applied ﬁlter of 8 mm full-width at half
maximum (FWHM) was used. Low-frequency drifts in the time
domain were removed by modeling the time series for each voxel
by a set of discrete cosine functions to which a cut-off of 128 s was
applied. The statistical analyses were performed using the general
linear model (GLM).
The imagination task was modeled as blocks with a duration of
32 s. The beeps of the DES procedure were modeled as events on
the onset of the beep with a duration of 0. These vectors were con-
volved with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF)
and its temporal derivatives.
For the DES procedure, we asked RH, on the basis of the DES
expositional interviews he (and others) had conducted, to classify
each of Lara’s 36 in-the-scanner experiences into four modalities:
verbal, visual, bodily, and auditory (categories could overlap). We
also asked RH to classify each of Lara’s experiences according to
which (if any) of the 5FP (inner speaking, inner seeing, unsym-
bolized thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness) were present.
RH’s classiﬁcations were checked by at least one other person
who had been present at the relevant interview; disagreements
were resolved by consensus. Then, regressors were built coding
the categories that RH had assigned to the 36 events. For display
purposes the resulting SPMs were thresholded at p < 0.001 and
a signiﬁcant effect was reported when the volume of the cluster
was greater than the Monte-Carlo-simulation-determined min-
imum cluster size above which the probability of type I error
was < 0.05 (AlphaSim; Ward, 2000). The resulting maps were
overlaid onto a normalized T1 weighted MNI template (colin27)
and the coordinates reported correspond to the MNI coordinate
system.
RESULTS
In Phase 1 (introduction/in-scanner elicitation) we investigated
whether Lara would produce results that aligned with what
conventional neuroscience would predict for inner speaking.
Figure 1A shows a comparison of mini-blocks in which Lara
had been instructed to imagine herself speaking (but not actu-
ally speaking aloud) compared against mini-blocks in which a
ﬁxation cross was shown. This ﬁgure shows that Lara’s brain pro-
duced the predicted activation of the inner speech network: left
IFG and STS as well as superior and middle temporal gyrus (see
also Table 1A).
FIGURE 1 | (A) Contrast of inner saying > ﬁxation in a conventional
neuroscientiﬁc mini-block design; (B) Contrast of verbal modality > all other
modalities (visual, bodily, and auditory) as deﬁned by DES; (C) Contrast of
inner speaking > all other categories as deﬁned by descriptive experience
sampling (DES) 5 frequent phenomena (5FP); (D) Contrast of inner
speaking > inner hearing of idiographic DES categories.
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There was no fMRI data collected during Phase 2. In Phase 3 we
ask ﬁrst whether the DES interviews conducted by RH are capable
of classifying Lara’s verbal experience in ways that correspond to
her neurophysiological activation. Figure 1B shows that when we
compare Lara’s brain activity in those moments that RH classiﬁed
as verbal to those classiﬁed as nonverbal (visual, bodily, or audi-
tory), Lara showed the predicted activation of left IFG (see also
Table 1B).
Next in Phase 3,we examine the 5FP category of inner speaking.
Samples that included inner speaking were spread throughout the
scanning sessions: three samples occurred during the third scan-
ning session, one each during the fourth, seventh, and eighth
scans, and two during the ninth scan. We modeled brain activity
across all 36 samples as a function of whether RH had said inner
speaking was or was not present. We did the same kind of uni-
variate modeling across all 36 samples for each of the remaining
four 5FP characteristics (that is, for inner seeing, for unsymbolized
thinking, for feelings, and for sensory awareness). Then across the
eight samples in which RH had said inner speaking was present,
we compared the average of results of the inner speaking model
to the average of the results of the four remaining models; this
Table 1A | Conventional imagination task: inner saying > fixation
(FWE p < 0.05).
Area BA Peak
coordinates
(MNI)
t -score Extent p
Left rolandic
operculum
6 −48, 2, 46 11.74 430 0.000
Left dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC), inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG)
46, 45 −39, 35, 34 9.14 337 0.000
Left middle
temporal gyrus
21 −51, −49, 10 8.92 80 0.000
Left middle
temporal gyrus
21 −66, −46, 4 8.06 77 0.000
Right visual
cortex
18 30, −97, 4 8.00 78 0.000
Right cerebellum
(Crus 2)
18, −82, −32 7.97 272 0.000
Left visual cortex 18 −33, −97, −5 7.62 23 0.000
Left angular gyrus 39 −45, −61, 49 7.02 107 0.000
Right temporal
pole
38 51, 20, −29 6.60 103 0.000
Left temporal
pole
38 −33, 20, −26 6.60 106 0.000
Ventromedial
prefrontal cortex
11 −3, 53, −17 6.04 26 0.000
Left IFG 45 −51, 20, 1 5.98 25 0.000
Table 1B | Descriptive experience sampling modalities: verbal
modality > all other categories (p < 0.001, k > 22).
Area BA Peak
coordinates
(MNI)
t -score Extent p
Right postcentral gyrus 3 48, −22, 43 5.05 102 0.000
Left IFG 45 −51, 29, 10 4.24 31 0.000
Anterior cingulate gyrus 32 0, 20, 43 4.02 34 0.000
analysis indicated the presence of activity in left IFG, the core
of the inner speech network (Figure 1C, Table 1C). We com-
pared inner speaking to the non-inner-speaking samples instead
of comparing against baseline because baseline includes times dur-
ing which Lara was responding to (jotting down notes about)
samples.
Because DES is primarily an idiographic technique, it is held to
be capable of describing characteristics that apply to one individ-
ual, regardless of whether those characteristics are important for
many or any other individuals. Therefore we asked RH to identify
characteristics that might emerge from Lara’s participation in the
DES procedure (during either or both the natural environment
and the in-the-scanner phases) that are not standard modality
features (verbal, visual, bodily, and auditory) and that are not
identiﬁed as 5FP, regardless of whether the feature was a charac-
teristic of any other DES participant. One such feature that RH
noted was that when Lara experienced inner words, they ranged
on a continuum from innerly spoken to innerly heard (Hurlburt
et al., 2013). The distinction between speaking and hearing may
be illustrated by the metaphor of speaking into a tape recorder
(production) and hearing your voice being played back (recep-
tion). Contrasting Lara’s brain activity during moments of inner
speaking vs. moments of inner hearing of her own voice resulted
in increased activity in left IFG (Figure 1D, Table 1D).
DISCUSSION
To summarize, whether prompted using a conventional imagery-
based fMRI paradigm or classiﬁed via use of the DES, Lara’s
Table 1C | Descriptive experience sampling 5FP: inner speaking > all
other categories (p < 0.001, k > 22).
Area BA Peak coordinates (MNI) t -score Extent p
Left IFG 45 −36, 32, 19 4.96 88 0.000
Left DLPFC 9 −12, 41, 43 4.26 58 0.000
Table 1D | Descriptive experience sampling idiographic: inner
speaking > Inner hearing (p < 0.001, k > 22).
Area BA Peak coordinates (MNI) t -score Extent p
Left IFG 45 −51, 41, −5 3.87 23 0.000
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experiences of inner speaking were, as expected, reliably associ-
ated with activation in left IFG. This validates the suggestion that
it is indeed possible for the DES procedure to apprehend features
of inner experience and to do so as they naturally occur—the
present study, for example, did not set out to investigate inner
speaking; it set out to investigate naturally occurring characteris-
tics of Lara’s inner experience whatever those characteristics might
be. DES identiﬁed inner speaking as an important feature of Lara’s
experience, and our study design allowed us then to demon-
strate predicted fMRI activations during the occurrence of that
feature.
The validation of high ﬁdelity apprehensions of inner experi-
ence demonstrated in the present study should not be taken as a
validation of all introspective or subjective reports—DES is, by
Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977; cf. Hurlburt, 2011, p. 195) analysis, an
exceptionalmethod. Furthermore, the present study should not be
taken as a validation of all DES-type reports—the demonstration
here was by just one DES investigator (and his colleagues) with
one participant. However, Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) showed
that inter-rater reliability could be high between DES practition-
ers. A related question is the one raised previously, namely why
we presented the case of Lara and not some or all of the other
participants. First, it is not possible to combine disparate idio-
graphic cases in a single journal article. Second, even if the case
of Lara were the only interesting case of the ﬁve, it is enough
to establish an important principle: fMRI data and particular-
moment-experiential data can be proﬁtably combined at least for
some participants in some situations.
The combination of phenomenology and neurophysiology
might be understood as a validation of DES: claims about pri-
vate experience are always questionable, and the fact that the DES
claims correlate with known neurophysiological results lends non-
trivial support to the adequacy of the DES claims. However, the
validation could be understood to operate the other way around:
that the DES descriptions lend support to fMRI techniques as a
way of investigating short-duration phenomenological character-
istics. Eitherway, such amergermight answer important questions
that are impossible even to pose without experiential data aimed
at particular moments of consciousness. Here are two examples.
First, Lara’s inner speaking results show that (at least for Lara)
there is a phenomenological distinction between innerly speak-
ing one’s voice and innerly hearing one’s voice being spoken. To
our knowledge, such a distinction is typically not attended to in
contemporary models of inner speech (Fernyhough, 2004; Scott,
2013), but it may be a crucial one for future studies. For example,
theories of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) that emphasize
monitoring of inner speech (e.g., Frith, 1995) may beneﬁt from
investigation of localizable differences between inner speaking and
inner hearing.
Also of interest was the relatively wider spread of activation
associated with imagined inner speech (Figure 1A) as compared
to unprompted moments of inner speaking classiﬁed by the DES
(Figures 1B,D). It must be borne in mind that these activation
mapshave differing levels of temporal precision in that the imagery
data come from a block design (continually producing bits of
inner speech over an extended period of time), whereas the DES
samples, by their nature, are targeted at very speciﬁc moments.
Nevertheless, one could speculate that these results reﬂect genuine
differences—that is, when Lara is prompted to imagine speaking,
her actual inner speaking is somewhat different (possibly dra-
matically different) from her naturally occurring inner speaking
both phenomenologically and neurologically (see Hurlburt et al.,
in preparation). One interpretation is that Lara’s actual experience
following the inner speech prompt also included some processing
of the prompt itself and some monitoring of inner speech produc-
tion. It shouldbenoted that prompted inner speech is anunnatural
phenomenon (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007), occurring very rarely
outside of psychological research laboratories. However, nearly all
psychological studies of inner speech are either retrospective or of
the prompted variety.
Given that this is a single case, we do not know whether
distinctions such as between inner speaking and inner hearing
and between prompted and unprompted inner speaking reﬂect
idiosyncratic characteristics of Lara (and/or of RH) or are char-
acteristic of other individuals who would regularly report inner
speaking as part of their everyday experience. The present study
cannot answer such questions, but it does provide a method
whereby such questions might be answered.
Furthermore, this study does not by itself establish a princi-
ple about introspections in general, because it investigated only
one method (DES) and one investigator (RH). For example, this
study should not be understood as saying that we should sim-
ply believe people when they tell us they are talking to themselves;
Hurlburt (2011) holds that people are often substantially mistaken
about such reports unless an adequate method is used. This study
should not be understood as saying that questionnaires about
experience or non-DES experience sampling are valid descriptors
of experience (Hurlburt and Heavey, 2014; Alderson-Day et al., in
preparation; Hurlburt et al., in preparation). This study does not
explore the boundaries or parameters of conﬁdence in DES (or
in RH)—that is, it does not characterize the situations where we
can be more (or less) conﬁdent about the correspondence between
self-reports and associated brain activity.
However, this study does suggest a new set of opportunities
for cognitive neuroscience investigations. Most fMRI studies ask
the participant in the scanner to perform a task that indirectly
invokes a particular set of brain functions in the scanner. Whether
receptive (e.g., merely viewing a ﬂashing display) or active (e.g.,
memorizing syllables), the aim of those tasks is indirect in the
sense that the task and stimuli are presumed to elicit the desired
brain functions. That is, participants do not observe or report any
aspect of their brain or mental function; they simply engage in the
task that presumably indirectly evokes the brain function.
As noted in the Introduction, some fMRI studies ask partic-
ipants in the scanner directly to rate their cognition or mental
activity on some predeﬁned measure (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009).
But until now, no study has tried to link fMRI measurements
to naturally occurring rather than task-elicited features of a par-
ticipant’s experiential phenomena in the scanner (Hurlburt et al.,
in preparation). Now that we have established that such studies
are possible, future investigations can explore the utility, limita-
tions, and boundaries of such studies, for example comparing DES
with other introspection methods and their correlation with brain
activity.
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